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activists. Relying upon the precedent set forth in Romer v. Evans,1 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated a California
initiative restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples in Perry v.
Brown2 (Perry VIII). Declaring that the initiative, Proposition 8,
deprived same-sex couples of a “societal status that affords dignity to
[same-sex] relationships” by barring recognition of those
relationships as “marriage,” 3 the court concluded that “the People of
California violated the Equal Protection Clause” by passing the
initiative.4 To do so, the court first determined whether its
jurisdiction was properly invoked in the appeal; its analysis centered
on the question of standing.5 The court concluded that the
proponents had standing, based largely on a theory that initiative
proponents were upholding the integrity of the initiative process.
Whatever the merits of the equal protection claim of Perry VIII may
be,6 the Ninth Circuit erred by upholding the district court’s
invalidation of the initiative on substantive grounds. This Note
argues that the federal appellate court lacked jurisdiction because the
appellants, proponents of Proposition 8, lacked standing. In doing
so, it argues that the federal appellate court erred in relying upon the
California Supreme Court’s answer to the certified question of
jurisdiction in Perry v. Brown7 (Perry VII). The state court’s decision
essentially opined that the proposition’s proponents had Article III
standing by virtue of state constitutional law conferring upon
initiative sponsors a right to defend their own initiatives should the
state executive abandon that charge.8
Part I discusses the finding of defender-proponent standing as
1. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2. 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). Due to the lengthy history of this litigation,
this Note follows the chronological designations of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in its substantive opinion in Perry VIII.
3. Id. at 1092.
4. Id. at 1096.
5. See id. at 1070 (noting that the question of standing had been the
jurisdictional issue that “prolonged [the court’s] consideration of [the Perry] case”).
6. As there are myriad writings that discuss the equal protection implications of
same sex marriage, this Note is restricted solely to a discussion on standing. For a
thorough discussion of the substantive constitutional claims, see Monte Neil Stewart
et al., Marriage, Fundamental Premises, and the California, Connecticut, and Iowa Supreme
Courts, 2012 BYU L. REV. 193, criticizing state court opinions upholding a right to
same-sex marriage; and Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional
Inevitability of Same-Sex Marriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471, 489 (2012), arguing that
“adherence to constitutional principle and respect for the fundamental dignity of all
persons dictate a clear result”: the recognition of same-sex marriage.
7. 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011).
8. See id. at 1021 (acknowledging the “reasonable debate” that surrounds the
question of whether the sponsors of successful initiatives have a distinct interest in
defending the sponsored law when it is challenged in California courts and finding
no case law preventing the recognition of such an interest).
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articulated by the California Supreme Court and adopted by the
Ninth Circuit; in addition, it also discusses the case law establishing
limits on standing relying solely upon injuries to the sovereign state.
Part II contends that non-governmental officials and entities—even
ballot sponsors —cannot vindicate the interests of the state because
such interests are nontransferable without an injury-in-fact and are
unique to the sovereign and its agents. This Note concludes by
asserting that, once a ballot initiative becomes law, a proponent
cannot rely on the institutional injury to the initiative process and
must show some other unique, particularized interest or injury-in-fact
to defend the law in federal court.9
I.

BACKGROUND

On November 4, 2008, California voters approved Proposition 8, a
statewide referendum which amended the state constitution and
vitiated a previously-recognized right of same-sex couples to marry.10
Two same-sex couples, comprised of Kristin Perry, Sandra Stier, Paul
Katami, and Jeffrey Zarrillo, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, seeking a preliminary injunction
invalidating the initiative-turned-law as unconstitutional.11 During
the district court’s consideration of the case, a group of Proposition 8
sponsors filed a motion to intervene;12 the trial court subsequently
granted the motion.13

9. Whether the proponents of Proposition 8 would have had individual
standing is beyond the scope of this Note. For an extensive analysis of individuated
standing in the Perry case, see Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What Can We Learn
When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551,
573–74 (2012), concluding that while the proponents of Proposition 8 would have
difficulty establishing a harm and a stake sufficient for Article III standing, the Court
would nevertheless recognize “special judicial solicitude” for those types of parties;
and Sara Rappaport, Comment, California Notwithstanding: Why the Ninth Circuit Erred
in Following the California Supreme Court’s Grant of Standing to the Proponents of Proposition
8, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2012), analyzing individual
standing in the Perry line of cases through the scope of the test outlined in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and the generalized grievance inquiry.
10. Perry VIII, 671 F.3d at 1067; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (recognizing
marriages between a man and a woman as exclusive in the State of California). See
generally Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and
Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357 (2009) (explaining the history and
ramifications of Proposition 8).
11. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry IV), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991–95 (N.D. Cal.
2010), aff’d, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
12. Proposed Intervenors’ Notice of Motion & Motion to Intervene, &
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion to Intervene at 1, Perry
IV, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW), 2009 WL 1499309.
13. Order Granting Motion to Intervene, Continuing Hearing on Preliminary
Injunction in Favor of a Case Management Conference on 7/2/2009 at 10 AM, Perry
IV, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921 (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW).
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The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the
amendment to the state constitution violated the Equal Protection
Clause by “enshrin[ing] . . . the notion that opposite-sex couples are
superior to same-sex couples.” 14 In doing so, the district court
concluded that “California has no interest in discriminating against
gay men and lesbians.” 15 With the district court denying a stay of its
ruling,16 the proposition’s proponents appealed the trial court’s
decision and requested a stay from the Ninth Circuit, which the court
granted almost immediately.17
In the meantime, the state
government declined to defend the validity of the law.18 In its grant
of a stay, the Ninth Circuit directed the proponents to discuss “why
[their] appeal should not be dismissed for lack of Article III
standing.” 19
The concept of standing has been described as a “complicated
specialty of federal jurisdiction.” 20 The modern principles of
standing were iterated in the Court’s decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,21 but the application of those foundational standards has
been inconsistent and controversial, especially in cases where
standing doctrine has been extended to recognize dubiously abstract
injuries and cases.22 The Perry VIII court broached an even newer
frontier: one where the party defending the case on the state’s behalf
is an admittedly uninjured one, wholly dependent upon the injury
inflicted upon the interests of a sovereign whose executive has
declined to vindicate the law.23

14. Perry IV, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
15. Id.
16. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
17. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 VRW, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (9th
Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
18. See Aaron Glantz, Kamala Harris Won’t Defend Prop. 8, BAY CITIZEN (Dec. 2,
2010, 11:58 AM), http://www.baycitizen.org/blogs/pulse-of-the-bay/kamala-harriswont-defend-prop-8/ (reporting on Attorney General-elect Kamala Harris’s victory
speech and noting her quote that she “will not defend Prop. 8”).
19. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1.
20. United States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 156
(1953).
21. 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (establishing the tripartite test for standing,
consisting of: an injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability).
22. Compare FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21, 24–25 (1998) (recognizing a
particularized, “informational injury” that arises from the plaintiffs’ inability to
obtain information-lists), with id. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Akins
majority for eroding the paramount requirement of standing that particularized
grievances are present, as opposed to generalized ones).
23. See Perry VIII, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (deeming questions as to
the personal injury suffered by initiative proponents irrelevant for standing purposes
as only the “authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s validity” was at
stake (citation omitted)).
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A. The Order of Battle: The Ninth Circuit’s Certified Question and the
California Supreme Court’s Response
Before analyzing the merits of the Proposition 8 proponents’
appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified a threshold question of standing to
the California Supreme Court: “[w]hether under Article II, Section 8
of the California Constitution,” an official initiative proponent who
possesses a “particularized interest in the initiative’s validity” may
defend the initiative’s constitutionality when state officials charged
with such defense have declined to do so.24
The California Supreme Court responded by declaring that the
proponents had standing for the appeal.25 The state court began its
inquiry by noting that the requisite elements of Article III standing
could be satisfied by an interest “to defend a challenged voterapproved initiative measure in order ‘to guard the people’s right to
exercise initiative power.’” 26 The California court deduced this
interest from the origins of the initiative power as enshrined in the
California Constitution, which was designed to allow for the adoption
of measures that elected officials declined to propose and enact into
law.27 A faithful defender of successful initiatives was “essential to the
integrity of the . . . process,” 28 and the state’s refusal to defend such
laws meant that the California Constitution impliedly authorized the
proponents of any successful initiative to step in the stead of the
state.29
Mindful of the unique interests of initiative proponents, the
California Supreme Court began its federal standing analysis by
expressing that it did not intend to “decide any issue of federal law”
and acknowledging that the question of standing was ultimately a
federal matter.30 The court did, however, surmise that in instances
where federal standing depended upon the sovereign state’s defense
of its laws, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Karcher v. May31
harmonized the federal standing inquiry with state law; in other
words, the California high court concluded that federal courts look to
“whom the state has authorized to assert the state interest in the
24. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry V), 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011).
25. Perry VII, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1016.
28. Id. at 1006.
29. See id. at 1006–07 (concluding that as initiative proponents are “the most
obvious and logical persons to assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity on
behalf of the voters who enacted the measure,” they are able to “step in to assert the
state’s interest” in the event that state officials fail to do so).
30. Id. at 1011.
31. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
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Thus, the dispositive
validity of the challenged measure.” 32
jurisdictional question in Perry VII was whether state law provided
such authorization to non-state actors.33
The California high court found such authorization within the
penumbra of the state constitution.34 While the state constitution did
not itself expressly authorize proponent representation of state
interests in the absence of a government-sponsored defense of
initiatives,35 the court emphasized that the absence of a party to
vigorously defend the law would risk jeopardizing the integrity of the
initiative process. Thus, not only were such proponents proper
parties to defend the legality of otherwise-abandoned initiatives
under California state law,36 such a result was appropriate as a matter
of sound judicial policy.37
Notwithstanding the central jurisdictional question, the state
supreme court made two additional and equally important
observations regarding standing.
First, the court all but
acknowledged that the proponents likely did not possess an
individuated injury-in-fact required for individual standing.38 In
addition, the court attempted to draw a distinction between
proponent standing and the standing attendant to private attorney
general causes of action: private attorney general causes of action
were affirmative authorizations to “act . . . on behalf of the public and
32. Perry VII, 265 P.3d at 1011.
33. See id. at 1013 (emphasizing the absence of state law authorization for
vindicators of state interests in prior cases); see also Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (observing that there was “no Arizona law
appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in lieu of
public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State”).
34. In finding that proponent standing was recognized by the California
Constitution, the state supreme court stressed the “nature and purpose” of the
initiative process rather than the face of the provision itself. See Perry VII, 265 P.3d at
1006. Thus, it would be fitting to conclude that while proponent standing under
California law does not derive directly from the Constitution’s initiative process, it is
a derivative jurisdictional element that emanates from the initiative provision.
35. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (establishing and outlining the power of state
electors to propose and approve or reject amendments to the state constitution).
36. See Perry VII, 265 P.3d at 1022 (stating that when state officials decline to
defend the constitutionality of successful initiatives, California courts should
“ordinarily permit the official proponents of an initiative measure to intervene in an
action challenging the validity of the measure in order ‘to guard the people’s right to
exercise initiative power’” (citing Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Camarillo, 718 P.2d 68,
75 (Cal. 1986))).
37. See id. at 1016 (reciting the principle of California judicial policy to protect
the initiative power by providing a liberal construction of it so that “the right be not
improperly annulled”).
38. See id. at 1021 (explaining that once a measure has been enacted as a
constitutional amendment, “it is arguably less clear that the official proponents
possess a personal legally protected stake that differs from that of [a generalized
grievance]”); see also id. at 1015 (declining to engage in an individuated inquiry for
proponents of a voter-approved initiative).

KIM.OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

“S TANDING ” IN THE WAY OF EQUALITY?

8/27/2012 12:23 PM

1873

institute proceedings to enforce a public right,” whereas proponent
standing was premised on “passive, defensive authority.” 39
Paradoxically, while taking pains to distinguish the private attorney
general doctrine from proponent standing, the court simultaneously
justified its opinion by reasoning that the private attorney general
doctrine, recognized under state law, reinforced the notion that
initiative proponents could satisfy Article III by relying on state law.40
After a lengthy exposition as to the nature of the initiative process,
the California court concluded that Proposition 8’s proponents likely
had standing sufficient to satisfy Article III.41
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion
Upon receiving the opinion of the California Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the decision in toto.42 The federal appellate
court adopted the logic of the California court and countenanced it
on the premise that “as independent sovereigns, [states may] decide
for themselves who may assert their interests and under what
circumstances, and . . . bestow that authority accordingly.” 43 As a
result, the Ninth Circuit deemed the California high court’s answer
to the certified question as dispositive of the jurisdictional issue: the
principles of federalism compelled the federal court to recognize all
legitimate vindicators of the state’s interests under California law as
having standing before the federal courts.44 So long as the state itself
has suffered an injury sufficiently cognizable to confer standing and
the proponent party possesses authorization under state law, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the initiative proponents could take the
place of the state in defense of Proposition 8’s validity.45
39. Id. at 1030 (emphasis added).
40. See id. (explaining that California’s private attorney general doctrine exists to
promote the public interest “by bringing lawsuits to enforce state constitutional or
statutory provisions in circumstances in which enforcement by public officials may
not be sufficient”).
41. Id. at 1025.
42. Perry VIII, 671 F.3d 1052, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2012).
43. See id. at 1071.
44. See id. at 1071–72 (deferring to the “[p]rinciples of federalism” that
prohibited federal courts from “tell[ing] a state who may appear on its behalf”).
Interestingly enough, the standing question in Perry led to a case of mutual
deference. The California Supreme Court deferred to the ultimate judgment of the
Ninth Circuit on the question of federal law; the Ninth Circuit, in turn, essentially
deferred to the state court. Compare Perry VII, 265 P.3d at 1011 (“[W]e fully
recognize that the effect that this opinion[] . . . may have on the question of standing
under federal law is a matter that ultimately will be decided by the federal courts.”),
with Perry VIII, 671 F.3d at 1072 (“Who may speak for the state is, necessarily, a
question of state law. . . . We are bound to accept the California court’s
determination.”).
45. Perry VIII, 671 F.3d at 1072.
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The federal appellate court also acknowledged, albeit indirectly,
that the proponents lacked individual standing to defend the law’s
validity.46 It did so in part by declining to inquire as to whether the
proponents had third-party standing;47 had the court done so, such
an inquiry would be tantamount to admitting that the proponents
could not rely on sovereign-conferred standing.48 But it is worth
noting that if individual standing did exist for the Perry proponents,
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance would have obligated the
court to decide the standing issue on narrower constitutional
grounds;49 in other words, the Ninth Circuit was obligated by the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance50 to rely upon the wellestablished individual injury analysis of Lujan51 rather than enter into
the uncharted frontier of extending sovereign standing to initiative
proponents if both assertions of standing were tenable.52 Having
failed to do so, the court impliedly admitted that the former did not
exist.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit brusquely dismissed the need to assess
whether the proponents had a personal injury that could lend itself
to Article III standing.53 Because of the state’s sovereign interest in
defending its laws and the role of initiative proponents as substitutes
46. See id. at 1074 (explaining that the proponents need only have the “authority
to assert the interests of the State of California, rather than any authority that they
might have to assert particularized interests of their own”).
47. See id. at 1073–74 (noting that the third-party standing inquiry was
unnecessary, as a proponent defending an otherwise abandoned measure “speaks to
the court as the State, not as a third party”).
48. See id. (asserting that the requirements of third-party standing are not
relevant because the proponents of Proposition 8 have no more need to satisfy these
requirements than state executive officers otherwise would).
49. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (listing a series of constitutional avoidance principles, one of which
includes the notion that a rule of constitutional law will be formulated no “broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied” (quoting Liverpool,
N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))).
50. Constitutional avoidance is generally a canon of statutory interpretation. See
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[T]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction
must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”).
Nevertheless, it is also a principle of jurisprudence where a federal court declines to
“decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to
dispose of [the] case.” See Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per
curiam). Using the logic of the latter principle, if a court can rely upon an
established means to dispose of a standing question, as opposed to interpreting a
new means of recognizing standing, the court should proceed by the well-established
analytical path.
51. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
52. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasizing that a
federal court should not decide new constitutional questions “unless absolutely
necessary” to decide the case).
53. Perry VIII, 671 F.3d at 1072.
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for state officers, the court reasoned that there was no need for such
discussion.54 Consequently, the federal appellate court concluded
that Proposition 8’s proponents possessed standing in accordance
with Article III, bypassing the individuated standing question.55
C. Karcher, Arizonans for Official English, and the Implied Limitations
on State-conferred Standing
Underpinning the decisions of the Ninth Circuit and the California
Supreme Court are the two seminal cases from the U.S. Supreme
Court involving an attempt to vindicate the state’s interest by
someone other than the sovereign’s executive agents: Karcher v.
May56 and Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona.57 In Karcher, the
Supreme Court considered whether the former presiding officers of
the New Jersey legislature could continue their defense of a state law
that the state executive had initially refused to defend after the
legislators lost their positions of high office in the state legislature.58
The Court held in the negative, reasoning that the legislature could
only be represented by officers acting in their official capacity,59 and
the former presiding officers could not rely merely on their status as
legislators to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction.60 The Court’s decision
in Karcher not only reaffirmed the now well-established rejection of
legislative standing,61 but also suggested that even possessing the
color of state authority, i.e., status as legislators, is insufficient for
taking the sovereign’s stead for purposes of Article III standing.62 An
uninjured party defending the state’s interests must be some official
emanation thereof.63
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1075.
56. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
57. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
58. Karcher, 484 U.S. at 74.
59. See id. at 77–78 (explaining that Karcher and Orechio’s loss of their positions
as “presiding legislative officers” meant that “[t]he authority to pursue the lawsuit
on behalf of the legislature belongs to those who succeeded [them] in office”).
60. See id. at 81 (concluding that individual legislator standing was insufficient to
grant authority to pursue the appeal on behalf of the legislature); see also id. at 84–85
(White, J., concurring in the judgment) (clarifying the scope of the Court’s opinion
by noting that the question of whether Karcher could have invoked legislator
standing was tabled for another day).
61. See id. at 84–85 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the Court’s
unwillingness to discuss legislative standing on the merits); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (holding that challenges to legislation based on status as
members of Congress did not satisfy Article III, as the perceived injuries were to the
institutional whole and not to the individual legislators themselves).
62. Cf. Karcher, 484 U.S. at 81 (holding that Karcher and Orechio’s ability to
pursue an appeal dissipated with their loss of legislative high office and their return
to their status as “individual legislators”).
63. Cf. id. at 77 (suggesting that the ability to defend the claim on behalf of the
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In Arizonans for Official English, the Court expanded the holding in
Karcher to include initiative sponsors, rejecting the notion that the
financial and political sponsors of a statewide initiative had “a quasilegislative interest in defending the constitutionality of the measure
they successfully sponsored.” 64 The Court’s rationale in so holding
was three-fold: first, the sponsors were not democratically elected
representatives of the people; second, Arizona law did not recognize
the sponsors as “agents of the people of Arizona to defend [the
validity of laws] in lieu of public officials”; and third, even if state
authorization was given to initiative proponents, the Court was
unsure as to whether they were “Article-III-qualified defenders of the
measures they advocated.” 65
In both Karcher and Arizonans for Official English, neither party was
injured by the respective states’ refusal to defend the challenged
law.66 Thus, in both instances, the defenders of the law relied solely
upon the sovereign’s interest in defending its own laws, claiming that
the injury to the sovereign in itself was enough.67 But each instance
was marked by a rejection by the Court of the non-state party’s
assertion of standing; in turn, three principles of jurisdiction were
impliedly revealed: first, one must actually be an official emanation of
the state to represent the state’s interests as an uninjured defender;
second, lawful authorization by the state is required to represent its
interests; and third, the question of whether a litigant has Article III
standing is separate from the inquiry as to whether a state has properly
and discernibly conferred its interests to a non-state party.68
II. ANALYSIS
The standing requirement of Article III is an axiomatic component
state rested with whoever officially held the legislative high office charged with
representing the interests of the entire legislature).
64. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997)
(declining to adopt a proposed corollary to Karcher where sponsorship of an initiative
is a sufficient “stake” in a controversy to establish Article III standing).
65. Id.
66. See id. at 57 (explaining the district court’s observation that the arguments
made by Arizonans for Official English (AOE) as to the expenses “spent to promote
the ballot initiative did not suffice to establish standing to sue or defend in a federal
tribunal” (emphasis added)); Karcher, 484 U.S. at 79 (noting that the district court
permitted Karcher and Orechio to intervene solely in a representative capacity).
67. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65 (summarizing AOE’s assertion
of a “quasi-legislative interest in defending the constitutionality of the measure they
successfully sponsored”); cf. Karcher, 484 U.S. at 78 (rejecting the argument that
representation in an individual legislative capacity was sufficient to provide Article III
standing).
68. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65 (explaining that an intervenor
in a cause of action, seeking to pursue an appeal on its own, must independently
meet the requirements of Article III).
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of federal jurisdiction;69 however, it is still an “amorphous,”
sometimes ill-defined concept that is wrought with “complexities and
vagaries.” 70 There are arguably many ways to reach the same
jurisdictional mountaintop.71
The modern standing inquiry requires, in part, that there be an
injury-in-fact that is “concrete and particularized,” and “actual or
imminent, not ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’” 72 As a corollary to this
principle, states are presumed to have standing to defend the validity
and constitutionality of their laws.73
While it is true that states may “decide for themselves who may
assert their interests,” 74 the state’s conferral of its sovereign interest
must still conform to the demands of Article III.75 Thus, the
defender of a state interest must be the state itself, a designated agent
of the state or an emanation thereof,76 or a non-state actor able to
demonstrate an injury-in-fact.77
69. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (describing Article III’s standing requirement as
a “bedrock requirement”).
70. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98 (1968).
71. See generally Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L.
REV. 1131 (2009) (providing an overview of the evolution of standing in the federal
courts).
72. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The two other
prongs of the standing inquiry are causation and redressability, which are not
necessarily at issue in this particular case.
73. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (reaffirming the principle
that “a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute”).
74. Perry VIII, 671 F.3d 1052, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Karcher v. May, 484
U.S. 72, 82 (1987) (relying upon state case law that permitted the New Jersey
Legislature to defend the state’s interests in certain instances (citing In re Forsythe,
450 A.2d 499, 500 (N.J. 1982) (per curiam))).
75. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (explaining that
Article III standing is a federal question that is not dependent upon state court
standing); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (articulating that “the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution” and that
this principle is “a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system”).
A state defending its own laws acquires standing automatically under Article III
and thus does not need to show an injury-in-fact; the injury to its sovereignty is simply
enough. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62 (explaining that states possess standing in the
defense of their own laws). Those other than the state seeking to vindicate the state’s
interest must show Article III standing by their own means and cannot rely on the
sovereign’s interest alone. See infra Part II.A (explaining why Karcher and Arizonans
for Official English foreclose the possibility of a state transferring its interest to an
uninjured non-state actor); infra Part II.B (contending that Stevens further forecloses
an uninjured party’s reliance on the sovereign injury, absent historical justification).
76. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908) (acknowledging the
authority of the attorney general to enforce a railroad rate statute as part of his
general powers pursuant to his service as a state officer). The phrase “emanation of
state” is a catch-all phrase used to include all state agencies and other entities that
would bear the imprimatur of state government. While the state executive is typically
charged with the prosecution of laws, the Court’s decision in Virginia Office for
Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011), suggests that other elements
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Instead of adhering to these principles, the Ninth Circuit took the
state constitution’s implied authorization of proponent standing and
summarily declared such authorization to be conclusive as to the
standing question.78 In doing so, the court failed to properly
constrain its application of sovereign standing and declined to
engage in an individuated standing analysis which would satisfy
Article III, thus improperly ruling on the merits of Perry VIII.
A. A Sovereign’s Ability to Designate a Defender of Its Interests Should Be
Limited by an “Emanation of State” Principle
While a state may designate a party to champion its interests in
federal court, that party nevertheless must meet the rigors of Article
III’s case-or-controversy requirement.79 A state acquires standing
solely by the virtue of it being a sovereign in defense of its laws;80 the
sovereign’s agents similarly acquire such standing only in their
official capacities, as the state has no choice but to speak through its
officers.81 Thus, no individuated injury-in-fact is necessary for the
state itself, its agents, or an emanation or other instrument of the
sovereign.82 However, if the party defending the state law on appeal
cannot be recognized as an agent or emanation of the sovereign, the
party must demonstrate an injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy Article
III’s requirements in order to vindicate the state’s interests.83
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Arizonans for Official English is
of the state government not distinctly part of the Executive could nonetheless possess
a sovereign’s interest and have Article III standing. See id. at 1636–38 (recognizing
that a state agency, with a board comprised of executive and legislative appointees,
could file a lawsuit against the state executive without impinging on fundamental
concepts of sovereign immunity).
77. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65 (“Even if there were circumstances in which a
private party would have standing to defend the constitutionality of a challenged
statute, this is not one of them. Diamond is not able to assert an injury in fact.”).
78. See Perry VIII, 671 F.3d at 1072 (holding that the California Supreme Court’s
opinion with respect to state law authorization for proponent standing was binding
on the entire jurisdictional question).
79. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)
(“Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement.”
(emphasis added)); supra Part I.C (describing the impact of Karcher and Arizonans for
Official English on standing jurisprudence).
80. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62–64 (restating the presumption that a state can
defend the validity of its own statute when it is a party before the court).
81. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that “the
intangible thing called a state, however extensive its powers,” can only be
represented “by and through its officers”).
82. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text (explaining how an
“emanation of state” theory is derived from the principle that a state has standing to
defend its own laws).
83. See infra notes 88–103 and accompanying text (describing why mere
authorization by the sovereign to defend the law does not satisfy Article III’s standing
requirements).
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instructive on two points:84 first, a federal court must inquire whether
state law explicitly authorizes representation;85 and second,
notwithstanding the answer to the first query, the court must inquire
whether Article III takes cognizance of the party as a proper
vindicator of the state law—in other words, whether an initiative
proponent can constitutionally champion the rights of the
sovereign.86 By accepting the affirmative answer to the first inquiry as
determinative of the second, the Ninth Circuit in Perry VIII conflated
the inquiries as one; in doing so, it failed to satisfy the rigorous
demands of Article III.87
In other words, a state law’s explicit or implied conferral of
litigation authority to an individual only satisfies the first query in
Arizonans for Official English; the question of whether an authorized
defender is “Article III qualified” and whether the state’s
authorization is proper under Article III is determined separately by
the limitations implied by Karcher. Put simply, the two-pronged
approach in Arizonans for Official English asks two different questions
of two different sovereigns: the first prong asks whether the state has
given its permission for its interests to be defended by someone else,
and the second asks whether the judicial power of the United States
recognizes that defender under its own rules of jurisdiction. Karcher
suggests that Article III allows only the state itself,88 its duly-appointed
agents,89 or an emanation of the state to properly represent the state’s
interests without a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact.90 Even
bearing the appearance of some colorable state authority is not
enough.

84. This does not include the Court’s separate inquiry as to whether the
proponent is an elected representative; for obvious reasons, this question is not
necessary except in Karcher-like circumstances where a legislator is involved.
85. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997)
(concluding that state law did not allow for the appointment of initiative sponsors as
agents of the state and its people).
86. See id. (questioning whether initiative proponents are proper defenders
under Article III).
87. See Perry VIII, 671 F.3d 1052, 1073 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the California
Supreme Court’s determination in Perry VII to be binding and dispositive of the
Article III standing question).
88. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (explaining that Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement would be presumptively met by a state defending
the constitutionality of one of its statutes).
89. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65 (highlighting the lack of
“Arizona law appointing [the] initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona”
(emphasis added)).
90. Cf. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011)
(considering whether an independent state agency outside of the purview of the state
executive branch can bypass the sovereign immunity requirement in a suit against a
state officer).
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In Karcher, the Court foreclosed the use of the legislative standing
doctrine as a means of allowing the former presiding officers to
defend the challenged law.91 Despite the fact that, as legislators,
Karcher and Orechio held some measurable color of state authority,
that alone was insufficient92—an uninjured party must be some official
embodiment of the sovereign to represent the state’s interests.93
Legislative standing, on the other hand, is a type of individual
standing that does not rely upon the power or authority of the state:
it does not exist because legislators are the legislature; rather, it exists
to protect a legislator’s role within the legislative body as an
individual member.94 Thus, whatever color of sovereign authority
Assemblyman Karcher may have appeared to have possessed as a
member of the New Jersey legislature was insufficient to stand in the
stead of the sovereign in an Article III court.95
Mindful of the principle that a state’s interests can only be
represented in an Article III court by an emanation of the state or an
injured non-state party, the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that
Proposition 8’s proponents were no different from a state attorney
general when defending an interest conferred by state statute is
puzzling.96 As Justice Harlan explained in his dissent in Ex parte
Young,97 a state cannot “appear or be represented or known in any
court in a litigated case, except by and through its officers.” 98
Consequently, it is obvious and well recognized that when a state
officer enforces a law and takes upon the legal defense attendant to
such execution, the officer is acting as both the state and in a
personal capacity.99
91. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81 (1987).
92. See id. (rejecting Karcher and Orechio’s status as “individual legislators and
representatives” as sufficient to confer sovereign standing).
93. See id. (emphasizing that the appellants could not act in their official
capacities because they no longer held legislative high office).
94. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 824 (1997) (declining to recognize legislator
standing in an instance where the legislators’ individual ability to vote had not been
interfered with); see also James A. Turner, Comment, The Post-Medellín Case for
Legislative Standing, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 748 (2011) (positing that in theory,
legislative standing must confront the same hurdles as “traditional” individual
standing, while encountering a more burdensome standard in practice).
95. See Karcher, 484 U.S. at 78–80.
96. See Perry VIII, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that because the
Attorney General of California “obviously need not show that she would suffer any
personal injury as a result of the statute’s invalidity” while vindicating a state interest,
the same principle must apply to the initiative proponents).
97. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
98. Id. at 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 157 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that a state officer can only
be enjoined from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional act if the officer had some
responsibility to enforce the act, as the lack thereof would be a poorly disguised
attempt to circumvent sovereign immunity by making a state a party by proxy); see
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The same cannot be said for an initiative proponent;100 an initiative
proponent does not act as an official emanation of the state, but
rather in a purely personal capacity, prompted to intervene by an
abstract interest of defending the integrity of the initiative process.101
An initiative proponent cannot rightfully contend that he or she is
representing the state in some official form.102 The mere fact that an
initiative proponent has been authorized to enforce the law, like the
Attorney General, does not make the proponent an enforcer of the
state and thus an official emanation thereof. Instead, it only satisfies
the first element of the Arizonans for Official English inquiry: whether
the state has given its permission.103 Article III, on the other hand,
demands some degree of official capacity, which such proponents do
not possess.
Some scholars suggest that intervenor-defendant standing can be
demonstrated by “showing a reasonable apprehension of injury from
judicial resolution of the plaintiff’s claim, or by establishing a right,
conferred by state or federal law, to defend against the plaintiff’s
claim.” 104 Such a standard, however, would merely be a variant of the
conflation in Perry VIII; it accepts that state law authorization is
sufficient to establish Article III standing, which contravenes the
more meticulous inquiry required by the Arizonans for Official English
Court.105 The more reasonable approach is to require the twopronged inquiry in Arizonans for Official English; a more onerous test
also Nathan C. Thomas, Note, The Withering Doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1068, 1078–79 (1998) (explaining the “legal fiction” of Ex parte Young that an
“official’s unconstitutional conduct [is] state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment” while “not attributable to the State for purposes of the Eleventh
[Amendment]” (quoting Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670,
685 (1982))).
100. Cf. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (failing
to discern any agency principle that would allow AOE to represent the state’s
interests in agency).
101. See Perry VII, 265 P.3d 1002, 1022 (Cal. 2011) (citing institutional reasons that
are protective of the initiative power as cause for recognizing proponent standing to
defend a successful initiative).
102. Cf. Perry VIII, 671 F.3d 1052, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing the unique
role of the state attorney general in defending suits against the state but asserting
that “states need not follow that approach” and can instead opt to allow for nongovernmental defenders to act “in lieu of public officials” (emphasis added)).
103. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65 (failing to discern an Arizona
law that grants initiative sponsors authority to act as agents of the people).
104. See, e.g., Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law
Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1571 (2012) (applying the intervenor-defendant
standing model to DOMA and Proposition 8 cases and concluding that Proposition 8
intervenors have standing while DOMA intervenors do not).
105. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65 (expressing two distinct
concerns with the AOE’s standing claim: first, that there was no law conferring
agency to ballot proponents; and second, whether the initiative proponents in
question were “Article-III-qualified defenders”).
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for defendant standing remains faithful to the notion that the power
of the federal courts should be employed “only ‘in the last resort, and
as a necessity.’” 106
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Stevens Further Solidifies the
Nontransferability of a State Sovereign Interest to an Uninjured Party
Another one of the Court’s more recent standing cases further
reinforces the notion that a non-state party cannot rely solely on an
injury to a sovereign for purposes of Article III standing, even with
the sovereign’s conferral of such an interest. Oddly enough, this
observation comes from the Court’s decision in Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens.107 Stevens was a qui tam
action108 by a relator who claimed that a state natural resources
agency was submitting false grant claims to the Environmental
Protection Agency.109 In Stevens, the relator did not claim a
personalized injury-in-fact; rather, the action was brought solely “in
the name of the government,” with financial spoils for a successful
prosecution by the relator.110 The relator sought to vindicate an
injury-in-fact to the sovereignty of the United States and a proprietary
injury to the nation for the fraud itself.111 The Court grappled with
whether to allow the relator to prosecute such a claim because the
power of Article III can only be invoked to remedy injuries to the
complaining party, not a third-party beneficiary who is without
injury.112
Despite the lack of an individuated injury-in-fact, the Court held
that the relator had Article III standing.113 It did so solely by virtue of
a quirk of legal history: qui tam actions were recognized under the
106. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry.
Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
107. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
108. Qui tam lawsuits have traditionally been used to “discover and prosecute
fraud against the national treasuries.” Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d
749, 752 (5th Cir. 2001). Relators are persons who bring civil actions on behalf of
the government, in the form of a qui tam suit, usually for some form of pecuniary
benefit; a relator generally is not personally injured. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)
(2006) (authorizing relators for qui tam actions filed for violations of the False Claims
Act); see also Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., 619 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(recognizing that a qui tam relator may suffer “no injury himself” but may rely
exclusively upon a statutory assignment of injury for purposes of standing).
109. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 770.
110. Id. at 769–70.
111. Id. at 771.
112. See id. at 771–72 (reiterating that “[t]he [Article] III judicial power exists
only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party” (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975))).
113. See id. at 777–78 (noting that there was no question as to whether an False
Claims Act qui tam relator had Article III standing).
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common law as a “case or controversy” and thus were cognizable
under Article III.114 The Court provided no rationale for how its
decision in Stevens could be reconciled with the modern Lujan
analysis, strongly suggesting that qui tam cases are sui generis,115
validated as “cases and controversies” within the meaning of Article
III because of their historical origins.116 Because of their idiosyncratic
nature, qui tam actions seem to be the exceptions that prove the rule:
without the virtue of legal history grandfathering a cause of action
into Article III, as in the case of qui tam actions, a non-state party must
otherwise demonstrate an injury-in-fact apart from the injury to the
sovereign the party seeks to vindicate.117 In Perry VIII, no such
historical quirks are available to justify the state’s conferral of its
interest to an uninjured initiative proponent. Thus, a successful
initiative proponent’s defense of an unenforced law, lacking a
cognizable injury, seems akin to “a generally available grievance
about government —claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it
does the public at large” —in other words, the citizen-suit forbidden
by Lujan.118
Anticipating comparisons to citizen-suit provisions, the California
Supreme Court reasoned that the Perry proponents were different
from those seeking to prosecute a generalized grievance in the form
of a citizen-suit because such proponents were fulfilling the role of
the state in asserting a “passive, defensive authority” to protect a law
they sought to enact through the initiative process.119 The Article III
jurisprudence of federal courts, however, does not readily distinguish
114. See id. (“We think this history well nigh conclusive with respect to the
question before us here: whether qui tam actions were ‘cases and controversies of the
sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’” (quoting Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998))).
115. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury In Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 275, 280 n.18 (2008) (summarizing the debate between those who consider
qui tam actions “sui generis” and those who consider qui tam actions as proving that
there is “no restriction whatsoever on private individuals enforcing public rights”
(citing Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 175–76 (1992); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson,
Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 727 (2004))).
116. See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV.
159, 202 (2011) (contending that the decision in Stevens could be explained by “the
practice of assigning claims [having] a venerable history” and also arguing that the
Lujan Court took care to distinguish qui tam actions from general citizen suits).
117. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1992)
(distinguishing qui tam actions from instances in which an injury-in-fact would be
necessary for Article III standing).
118. See id. at 573–74.
119. Perry VII, 265 P.3d 1002, 1030 (Cal. 2011).
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between plaintiff and defendant standing.120 Indeed, the California
court made its distinction without support from case law; instead, it
was veered towards its decision by the policy of safeguarding the
integrity of the initiative process121—t he very type of interest that is
too “generalized” for anyone other than the state executive to
vindicate in federal court.122
Further cementing the idea that the state sovereign interest is not
transferable to an uninjured non-state party is the fact that the
Supreme Court has recognized, albeit in the context of states as
plaintiffs, that states have a “special position and interest” as quasisovereign entities.123 The “special solicitude” that the Court has
recognized attaches to the state as a party, not the nature of the state’s
interest.124 This solicitude exists precisely because the state, as a party,
has the capacity to defend an “interest independent of and behind
the titles of its citizens” 125⎯it does so strictly by acting as parens
patriae.126 When a non-state party attempts to do the same, an Article
III court becomes nothing more than a “forum in which to air . . .
generalized grievances about the conduct of government.” 127
The lesson learned from the Court’s standing jurisprudence,
particularly with respect to standing based on the sovereign’s
interests, is straightforward: a state is entitled to special consideration
with respect to Article III standing when it is party to the litigation
vindicating its own interests,128 but that solicitude dissipates when an
uninjured non-state actor attempts to vindicate the state’s interests on

120. See Hall, supra note 104, at 1542 (opining that the question of standing to
defend has not been “comprehensively considered” and that the courts addressing
the matter have “developed no coherent theory and thus have produced illconsidered and inconsistent outcomes”).
121. See Perry VII, 265 P.3d at 1030 (justifying proponent standing in part on the
premise that such a defense would “guard the people’s right to exercise initiative
power”).
122. Cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (warning that the prosecution of claims by the
“undifferentiated public interest” would result in interference with the functions of
the federal executive).
123. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
124. See id. at 518, 520 (discerning “considerable relevance” in the nature of the
sovereign state as a party, in contrast to the private individual of Lujan).
125. Id. at 518 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
126. Id. at 520 n.17. But cf. Katherine M. Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State
Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2053, 2066–67 (2011) (emphasizing the distinction
between a sovereign interest and a quasi-sovereign interest and that the exercise of a
state’s parens patriae power only applies to claims defending quasi-sovereign
interests).
127. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974).
128. See Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II et al., State Sovereign Standing: Often Overlooked,
but Not Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 89, 108 (2012) (observing that the Court has
“repeatedly held that states, as an incident of sovereignty, have the ability to protect
their enactments from being challenged in federal court” (emphasis added)).
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the sovereign’s behalf, even with the sovereign’s permission.129
Arguably, making the case for the peculiarity and the nontransferable
nature of the state’s solicitude is easier in Perry than cases involving
so-called “quasi-sovereign interests,” as the Court has long
recognized the distinct nature of the sovereign’s ability to “exercise . .
. sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant
jurisdiction . . . [including] the power to . . . enforce a legal code.” 130
The Ninth Circuit, in accepting the advisory opinion of the
California Supreme Court wholesale, neglected to conduct a proper
Article III analysis; such an analysis would have revealed that whatever
the state constitution conferred to initiative proponents, it was
insufficient for establishing Article III standing.131 The federal
appeals court failed to recognize the dissipation of solicitude that
made the proponents’ reliance on the state’s interest untenable.132
Lacking a personalized injury-in-fact, the state constitution’s implied
conferral of interest is little more than an attempt “to convert the
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with
the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts.’” 133 This is
an intolerable invocation of the judicial power of Article III.
CONCLUSION
The jurisdictional circumstances of Perry are likely to be rarely
encountered; in most instances where a state confers the
responsibility of vindicating its interests to private attorneys general,
it would not be difficult to discern an injury-in-fact particularized to a
litigant.134 Moreover, an “emanation of state” constraint on Article
129. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (reasoning that as states are
the only entities who create legal codes, states are the only parties that have a “direct
stake” that meets the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III); see also Bond v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011) (commenting that it may be entirely
possible that “a State is the only entity capable of demonstrating the requisite
injury”).
130. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–
02 (1982) (distinguishing the sovereign interest of enforcement from a number of
other interests, including non-sovereign proprietary interests, non-sovereign private
interests where the state serves as a nominal party, and “quasi-sovereign” interests of
the state in the well-being of its citizens).
131. See supra Part I.C (explaining the limits on state-conferred standing).
132. See supra notes 123–30 and accompanying text (arguing that the special
solicitude accorded to states cannot be transferred to other parties).
133. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
134. E.g., Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 246–47 (D.C. 2011) (en banc)
(dismissing a complainant’s action filed to vindicate the interests of “the general
public” for failure to plead an injury). In Grayson, the D.C. Court of Appeals, which
subscribes to Article III principles of justiciability, noted that a representative action
would have been possible had one of the complainants, Paul Breakman, pled an
injury-in-fact. See id. at 247 (“By stating that he brings his claim in a wholly
representative capacity, Mr. Breakman essentially implies that as the ‘party seeking
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III standing would not affect the typical case involving a citizensponsored
initiative—i.e.,
a
challenge
by
individuals
unconstitutionally burdened by a state law, as such challengers could
demonstrate the requisite injury-in-fact by the burden they bear. 135
Requiring that the uninjured vindicator of a state law, citizensponsored or otherwise, be an emanation of the state merely reflects
the reality that the sovereign may be the “only entity capable of
demonstrating the requisite injury.” 136 To hold otherwise would
result in a cascading erosion of the “bedrock principle” of standing.
If uninjured proponents of an initiative are cognizable litigants under
Article III, then it is difficult to discern where to draw the line.137
Hence, the Ninth Circuit erred in Perry VIII by recognizing that the
proponents, lacking any emanation of state authority, had standing to
appeal. No matter how well-intentioned the court was in reaching
the merits, it should not have done so. This is especially true given
the reality that whatever the answer to the threshold jurisdictional
question might be, the result is the same: “marriage equality will exist
in California, at least unless and until in some other case, some day,
the Supreme Court comes to a different conclusion.” 138

review,’ he ‘himself [is not] among the injured.’” (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563)).
135. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996) (invalidating a referendum
measure designed to prevent sub-state entities from protecting gays and lesbians as a
class).
136. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011).
137. Even the California Supreme Court recognized this difficulty. See Perry VII,
265 P.3d 1002, 1021 (Cal. 2011) (acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing
between the interest of the proponents and a voter or citizen of California in
general).
138. Erwin Chemerinsky, Prop. 8—A Matter of Standing, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010,
at A30.

